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CARL TOBIAS* 
Natural Resources and the White 
Commission Report 
I ndividuals and entities with concerns regarding environmental issues as well as those concerned about the federal judicial 
system have carefully followed the debate over the possible divi-
sion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
that has been raging since 1995. During the first session of the 
105th Congress, the Senate approved an appropriations rider, 
which would have established a new Twelfth Circuit including 
Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington, 
Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands, and would have left 
California and Nevada in the Ninth Circuit. That action was very 
important because neither house of Congress had ever voted to 
split the Ninth Circuit, and this session could well have done so. 
Circuit division might have significantly affected the environ-
ment, public lands, and natural resources, as well as the federal 
courts of the West and the nation. In November 1997, however, 
Congress rejected circuit bifurcation and approved a study of the 
appellate system that would emphasize the Ninth Circuit. 
Congress authorized the Chief Justice of the United States to 
appoint the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Fed-
eral Courts of Appeals (the Commission) in December 1997. 
The Commission closely analyzed the appellate courts and the 
Ninth Circuit for nearly a year and issued a report with construc-
tive suggestions for improvement. 1 Because the commissioners 
were experts, had committed much effort to the assessment, and 
developed a comprehensive report, their recommendations 
promised to be influential. For example, the Commission pro-
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las 
Vegas. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner for her valuable suggestions, Eleanor Davison 
for processing this piece, and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing support. This 
Article is for Margery Hunter Brown. Errors that remain are mine. 
1 See COMMISSION ON STRUcrURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 
OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT (Dec. 1998) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. 
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posed the idea of adjudicative divisions for the Ninth Circuit to-
day and for the other appeals courts as they grow, while the 
commissioners clearly and forcefully rejected the possibility of 
splitting the Ninth Circuit. These suggestions have already 
proved controversial. For instance, soon after the Commission 
tentatively recommended the divisional arrangement, most active 
and senior appellate judges of the Ninth Circuit sharply criticized 
it, even as seven other members of the court urged the commis-
sioners to endorse bifurcation. Some senators who reluctantly 
agreed to the study as a necessary, albeit unpalatable, condition 
precedent to dividing the circuit, recently introduced proposed 
legislation which would split the court, while several senators had 
earlier offered a measure that incorporates the Commission's 
suggestions.2 
If Congress passes a statute that would bifurcate the Ninth Cir-
cuit or adopts the Commission's concept of adjudicative divisions 
and additional Commission recommendations, these actions 
could substantially affect the environment and the federal courts 
in the western United States and the country. The extraordinary 
quantity and quality of natural resources that the Ninth Circuit 
encompasses accentuate the importance of the commissioners' 
report and proposals. Illustrative are the large percentage of na-
tional parks, the many wilderness areas, and the significant num-
ber of national wildlife refuges that are situated in the Ninth 
Circuit. 
These considerations mean that the recent report and sugges-
tions of the Commission deserve evaluation. This Article under-
takes that effort. Part I of the Article analyzes the developments 
that led to the creation of the Commission. Part II briefly dis-
cusses the commissioners' work. Part III analyzes the Commis-
sion's report and proposals by emphasizing the potential effects 
of the recommendations on natural resources. Part IV sets forth 
suggestions for the future. 
I 
CREATION OF THE COMMISSION 
The origin of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for 
the Federal Courts of Appeals warrants comparatively limited 
exploration in this Article because much of the relevant history 
2 See S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 2184, 106th Cong. (2000). 
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has been examined elsewhere.3 Nevertheless, some considera-
tion of issues that implicate natural resources is justified, as that 
evaluation informs comprehension of the report and proposals 
that the commissioners recently published. 
During May 1995, senators from Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Or-
egon, and Washington introduced measures that would have di-
vided the Nin~h Circuit.4 Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.) and 
Senator Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) led the effort to split the court, 
and Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Chair of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, held a hearing on Senate Bill 956 four months later. 
Advocates articulated three major contentions in support of 
the proposed legislation, while critics developed numerous re-
sponses to these arguments and several reasons opposing bifurca-
tion. First, proponents asserted that the court's substantial 
magnitude poses difficulties.5 The complications encompass geo-
graphic size, travel and related expenses, the people whom the 
circuit serves, the complement of twenty-eight judges, the court's 
caseload and concomitant time to resolve appeals, and the cost of 
operating the circuit. Opponents of the bill tendered several re-
sponses. They claimed that the court has implemented measures 
for treating problems ascribed to size.6 For example, the location 
of administrative units in Pasadena and Seattle, where appeals 
can be orally argued, addresses the distances that attorneys and 
litigants must travel. Critics also asserted that large size is an 
advantage.7 For instance, it affords economies of scale and diver-
sity in terms of cases' novelty and complexity and in terms of 
3 See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why the Propo-
sal to Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such a 
Good Idea, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 917 (1990) (hereinafter Baker, On Redrawing Circuit 
Boundaries]; Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMoR v L.J. 
1357 (1995) (hereinafter Tobias, Impoverished Idea]; Carl Tobias, Natural Resources 
and the Ninth Circuit Split, 28 ENVTL. L. 411 (1998). I rely substantially in this Arti-
cle on these three articles and on THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON AP-
PEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (1994). 
4 See S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995). 
5 See 141 CONG. REc. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Slade 
Gorton (R-Wash.)) (hereinafter Gorton Statement]; 141 CONG. REc. S7505-06 (daily 
ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Conrad Burns (R-Mont.)) (hereinafter Burns 
Statement]. See generally Tobias, Impoverished Idea, supra note 3, at 1366-69 (dis-
cussing the impacts of geographic size on the Ninth Circuit). 
6 See The Ninth Circuit Split: Hearings on S. 956 Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 29-31 (1995) (hereinafter S. 956 Hearings J (statement of 
Chief Judge Clifford Wallace, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit). 
7 See id.; Office of the Circuit Executive of the U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit. 
Position Paper in Opposition to S. 956-Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganiza-
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judges' race, gender, political perspectives, and geographic 
origins. 
Another important contention of Senate Bill 956's sponsors 
was that circuit case law was inconsistent.8 They stated that the 
statistical opportunities for conflicts are significant in part be-
cause 3,276 combinations of three-judge panels might theoreti-
cally be constituted to treat a question.9 The Ninth Circuit 
Executive Office and federal courts observers who have analyzed 
circuit decisionmaking have found little inconsistency. 10 The 
court has correspondingly instituted procedures to address possi-
ble conflicts. 11 For example, staff attorneys review each appeal 
and code the issues for consideration into a computer. The court 
then assigns to the same three-judge panel those cases that in-
volve similar issues and are ready for resolution at the same time. 
The proponents' argument most relevant to the issues explored 
in this Article is that California judges, appeals, and viewpoints 
dominate the Pacific Northwest.12 The idea could reflect advo-
cates' opposition to the court's decisions in fields such as envi-
ronmental, public lands, and natural resources law. One initial 
co-sponsor of the measure stated that an important reason for its 
introduction was an increase in lawsuits against economic activi-
ties, including mining and timber, which threatens local financial 
stability.13 The lawmaker later observed that the present Ninth 
tion Act of 1995, 4, reprinted in 141 CoNG. REc. S10436-02 (daily ed. July 20, 1995) 
[hereinafter S. 956 Position Paper]. 
8 See Burns Statement, supra note 5; Gorton Statement, supra note 5; Tobias, 
lmpoverished Idea, supra note 3, at 1369-71. 
9 See Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 3, at 938; see also 
Burns Statement, supra note 5; Gorton Statement, supra note 5. 
10 See S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 7, at S10437; S. 956 Hearings, supra note 
6 (statement of Professor Arthur D. Hellman, University of Pittsburgh School of 
Law); see also Arthur D. Hellman. Maintaining Consistency in the Law of the Large 
Circuit, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 55-90 (Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990); 
Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 3, at 938-50; Arthur D. 
Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common Law Process in the Large Appellate 
Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915 (1991); Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurispru-
dence: The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 541 (1989). 
11 See Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries. supra note 3, at 939; Arthur D. 
Hellman. Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 
CAL L. REv. 937, 945 (1980); S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 7, at Sl0437-38. 
12 See Burns Statement. supra note 5; Gorton Statement, supra note 5; see also 
Tobias. Impoverished Idea, supra note 3, at 1371-73. 
13 See Conrad Burns, Gorton-Burns Bill Would Split the Ninth Circuit Court of 
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Circuit deprives states that depend substantially on resource 
management of the opportunity to have judges who might be 
more responsive to local needs resolve cases that raise environ-
mental issues. 14 Additional proponents of the bill expressly dis-
avowed these concepts. The Senate Committee Report, which 
accompanied Senate Bill 956, specifically stated that dissatisfac-
tion with the court's opinions which involved resources was an 
inappropriate reason for bifurcation, even as the report acknowl-
edged that certain advocates had voiced this concern. 15 
Some critics characterized Senate Bill 956 as environmental 
gerrymandering, asserted that its sponsors were attempting to 
create a new Twelfth Circuit which would be more receptive to 
resource development, and urged that the better way to realize 
substantive legal change is by persuading Congress to modify ap-
plicable statutes.16 Opponents concomitantly attacked the pro-
ponents' essential premise that circuit judges in California are 
idiosyncratic and similar.17 Evaluation of their philosophies and 
the computerized, random selection of panels erode efforts to 
stereotype those California circuit judges. Critics also contended 
that the court's record in treating natural resources cases was 
rather neutral.18 
Advocates of division contended that judges on a smaller 
court, such as the proposed Twelfth Circuit which would have 
had thirteen judges, are more collegial, thereby increasing effi-
ciency.19 This notion may be accurate, but familiarity can also 
promote detrimental routinization and even foster disagree-
ments. Opponents of circuit-splitting argued that the projected 
Appeals; Burns to Hold Up Judicial Nominations Until Bill is Approved (May 25, 
1995) (press release, on file with author). 
14 See Neil A. Lewis, Partisan Gridlock Blocks Senate Confirmations of Federal 
Judges, N.Y. TIMES. Nov. 30, 1995, at A16; see also Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Reorganization Act of 1995, S. REP. No. 104-197, at 26 (1995). 
15 See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8-9. 
16 See id. at 26-27; see also Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 
1989: Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong. 284 (1990) [hereinafter S. 948 Hearing J 
(statement of Sen. Pete Wilson (R-Cal.)) (providing earlier accusation of environ-
mental gerrymandering). 
17 See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 16, at 284-85; Baker, On Redrawing Circuit 
Boundaries, supra note 3. at 941; Tobias, Impoverished Idea, supra note 3, at 1372. 
18 See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 27; see also infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
19 See Tobias, Impoverished Idea, supra note 3, at 1385-86. See generally FRANK 
M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: CouRTS, LAWYERING AND JuDGING 213-29 (1994) (con-
cluding that a collegial court is one in which each judge's strengths and qualities are 
valued and each judge knows they are valued). 
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Ninth Circuit would have had a substantially less beneficial ratio 
of three-judge panels to appeals than the proposed Twelfth Cir-
cuit, and a considerably less advantageous ratio than the present 
Ninth Circuit.2° Critics asserted that the new Twelfth Circuit 
would have entailed much administrative expense, particularly 
by duplicating functions that the current Ninth Circuit was per-
forming well.21 Moreover, opponents claimed that bifurcating 
the court would have fractured the consistent interpretation of 
federal environmental, public lands, and natural resources legis-
lation, which it has applied uniformly in the western United 
States and across ecosystems that traverse the political bounda-
ries of the two projected circuits.22 
In autumn 1995, the champions of Senate Bill 956 held discus-
sions with certain Judiciary Committee members and senators 
from states that the court's division would have affected.23 Ari-
zona seemed to assume importance for Senate Bill 956's advo-
cates who believed that the committee vote of Senator Jon Kyl 
(R-Ariz.) was significant and that the state's caseload, population 
and Ninth Circuit active judges were important to attaining ac-
ceptable bifurcation. The proponents examined the prospect of 
placing Arizona in the Tenth Circuit, but jettisoned the idea be-
cause it contravened the tradition of not transferring states be-
tween appellate courts. 
During a December 1995 Senate Judiciary Committee markup 
session, Committee members approved an amendment that 
moved Arizona and Nevada to the projected Twelfth Circuit, au-
thorized thirteen judges for this court, and placed its headquar-
ters in Phoenix.24 The Committee, except Senator Howell Heflin 
(D-Ala.), approved the revised proposal along strict political 
20 See S. 956 Hearings, supra note 6, at 29-31 (statement of Chief Judge Clifford 
Wallace); S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 7, at S10437. 
21 See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 24-25; S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 7, at 
S10437. 
22 See S. 956 Hearings, supra note 6; S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 7, at 
S10437; see also S. 948 Hearing, supra note 16, at 508 (statement of Michael Tray-
nor, Chair, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund) (affording earlier expression of idea); 
S. 948 Hearing, supra note 16, at 285 (statement of Pete Wilson (R-Cal.)) (same). 
23 I rely substantially in this paragraph on conversations with numerous individu-
als who are familiar with the developments that transpired. See also S. REP. No. 
104-197, at 5-6. 
24 See S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); Hearings on Markup of S. 956 Before the Senate 
Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong. (1995) (hereinafter Markup Hearings]; see also Adri-
anne Flynn, Senate Panel OKs New Appeals Court; Circuit Would Be Based in Phoe-
nix, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 8, 1995, at Bl. 
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party lines.25 Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) strongly op-
posed the change on several grounds.26 Most significant were the 
numerous benefits that the proposed Twelfth Circuit would have 
secured at the expense of the projected Ninth Circuit. For exam-
ple, the new Ninth Circuit would have had a disadvantageous ra-
tio of three-judge panels to appeals and would have effectively 
been a one-state appellate court. Senator Feinstein tendered an 
amendment that would have instituted a national commission to 
assess circuit structure, but the Committee rejected this prospect. 
On the eve of the Committee markup, Governor Pete Wilson 
(R-Cal.) sent Senator Hatch a letter that strongly opposed any 
Ninth Circuit realignment, pending the completion of an objec-
tive analysis of the court, and stated that bifurcation would foster 
inconsistency along the West Coast in important fields, including 
natural resources law.27 Chief Judge J. Clifford Wallace wrote 
the one hundred senators to explain why the Circuit Judicial 
Council and virtually every active judge of the court rejected di-
vision and to ask that Congress approve a national study.28 
Ninth Circuit Judge Charles Wiggins correspondingly contacted 
Senator Feinstein to voice his vociferous opposition to Senate 
Bill 956 and to request that Congress authorize an evaluation.29 
In March 1996, Senate Bill 956's advocates attempted to have 
the Senate pass the measure when considering a federal courts 
appropriations bill.3° Considerable substantive debate on circuit-
splitting's merits occurred, but the proposal's proponents deter-
mined that they lacked enough votes and agreed to a compro-
mise that would authorize a national study commission. This 
25 See Markup Hearings, supra note 24; see also S. REP. No. 104-197, at 6; Flynn. 
supra note 24. 
26 See Markup Hearings, supra note 24; see also S. REP. No. 104-197, at 19-20. 29-
31; Flynn, supra note 24. 
27 See Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-
Utah), Chair, U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm. (Dec. 6, 1995) (on file with author). 
28 See, e.g., Letter from Chief Judge Clifford Wallace, United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, to Sen. Spencer Abraham (R-Mich.) (Dec. 21, 1995) (on 
file with author); see also S. REP. No. 104-197, at 6 (suggesting need for study of 
appellate system). 
29 See Letter from Judge Charles E. Wiggins, United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, to Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) (Dec. 18, 1995) (on file with 
author); see also S. 956 Hearings, supra note 6, at 107 (statement of Sen. Howell 
Heflin (D-Ala.)) (suggesting need for "careful evaluation of the entire appellate 
court structure"). 
30 See 142 CoNG. REc. S2219-303 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996); see also Carl Tobias, A 
Proposal to Study the Federal Appellate System, 167 F.R.D. 275, 279 (1996). 
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passed easily with bipartisan support.31 The proposal was trans-
mitted to the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and 
Judicial Administration chaired by Representative Carlos Moor-
head (R-Cal.).32 The measure remained in the subcommittee un-
til September, when a few senators threatened to attach it to a 
court appropriations bill. This prompted Representative Moor-
head to act on the proposal. Nonetheless, Congress adjourned 
before passing the measure, although it did appropriate $500,000 
for a study. 
Senators who favored circuit division introduced a bill to do so 
during the 105th Congress.33 The three major justifications-the 
court's great size, conflicts in circuit case precedent, and Califor-
nia's purported dominance of the court-which proponents had 
enunciated, remained as relevant as they had been in the 104th 
Congress.34 Circuit-splitting advocates even claimed that some 
features of the court's operations had worsened since 1995. For 
example, champions suggested that the populace whom the court 
serves and the circuit's dockets continued to expand and would 
grow over the foreseeable future, while the court had not de-
creased the time needed to decide appeals.35 Critics stated that 
the judges had improved certain aspects of caseload resolution, 
namely the speed with which they write opinions once appeals 
are argued.36 
The other principal arguments-increasing conflicts and Cali-
fornia dominance of the Pacific Northwest-advocated by propo-
nents of circuit splitting were less convincing than the 
contentions respecting size.37 The Senate Judiciary Committee 
had adopted Senate Bill 956, although some relatively recent in-
formation indicated that intracircuit inconsistency was not a ma-
jor difficulty and that California dominance could not be 
determined by evaluating the court's environmental decisions. 
31 See 142 CoNG. REc. S2544-45 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996). 
32 I rely in this sentence and in the remainder of this paragraph on conversations 
with numerous individuals who are familiar with the developments that transpired. 
33 See S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997). 
34 See supra notes 4-19 and accompanying text. See generally Tobias, Impover-
ished Idea, supra note 3, at 1366-73 (analyzing the three major justifications). 
35 See 143 CoNG. REc. Sll04 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1997) (statement of Sen. Conrad 
Burns (R-Mont.)); see also Gorton Statement, supra note 5; S. REP. No. 104-197, at 
6-11 (1995). 
36 See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 28; S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 7, at S10438; 
see also S. 956 Hearings, supra note 6. 
37 See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text. 
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For instance, Professor Arthur Hellman, who has analyzed the 
Ninth Circuit as much as any legal scholar, testified that studies 
of the court's case law revealed few conflicts.38 Senator Feinstein 
observed that examination of 129 recent appeals involving natu-
ral resources found 64 that were "pro-environment" and 65 that 
were "con-environment."39 The Senate Committee Report cor-
respondingly rejected disagreement with the court's rulings in the 
natural resources area as a proper reason for division.40 
Several considerations assessed above and others indicate that 
pressure to bifurcate the Ninth Circuit or at least implement divi-
sions will continue to grow. As judges assume senior status or 
resign, more members will join the court who may not be con-
cerned with keeping the circuit intact. Indeed, before the 104th 
Congress, no judge of the court had publicly favored realign-
ment.41 New members, who are not steeped in circuit traditions, 
may be less committed to maintaining the court's century-old 
structure. 
Pressure to split the circuit or institute divisions will also per-
sist until Congress discovers a better way to address docket 
growth than approving more judgeships and bifurcating cir-
cuits.42 Congress continues to authorize judges and divide 
courts, although there are many structural and non-structural 
measures that may have greater efficacy. For example, Congress 
could limit civil or criminal jurisdiction, establish subject matter 
courts, or restrict the right of appeal.43 
The ongoing debate over whether the Ninth Circuit warrants 
division also led members of Congress to introduce several pro-
posals that would authorize studies of the federal appeals courts 
38 See supra note 10; see also supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. But see S. 
REP. No. 104-197, at 10. 
39 See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 27; see also supra notes 12-18 and accompanying 
text. But see supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
40 See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 88-92 and accom-
panying text. 
41 See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 20. Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain sug-
gested in testimony at the Senate hearing that he considered division appropriate 
and inevitable. See S. 956 Hearings, supra note 6, at 69; see also Comments to Com-
mission on Draft Report of Eugene A. Wright et al. (1998). 
42 See Baker, supra note 3, at 99-105; Tobias, Impoverished Idea, supra note 3, at 
1386-95; see also S. REP. No. 104-197, at 18. 
43 For thorough analysis of these and numerous other options. see Baker, supra 
note 3, at 106-286; see also infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text (analyzing 
options); S. REP. No. 104-197. at 6 (summarizing and epitomizing views that increas-
ing numbers of members of Congress and judges may hold on the Ninth Circuit). 
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in the first session of the 105th Congress. During January 1997, 
Senators Feinstein and Harry Reid (D-Nev.) sponsored a bill that 
would have approved a national commission to evaluate the ap-
peals courts.44 Senator Burns and Representative Rick Hill (R-
Mont.) then introduced a similar study commission measure that 
differed in important respects from that offered by Senators 
Feinstein and Reid.45 In March, Representative Howard Coble 
(R-N.C.) and Representative Howard Berman (D-Cal.) tendered 
a proposal that was similar to the Feinstein-Reid bill, and the 
House subsequently modified it.46 That month, senators from 
Pacific Northwest states sponsored a measure that would have 
divided the Ninth Circuit by moving Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington to the proposed 
Twelfth Circuit and leaving California, Hawaii, Guam, and the 
Northern Mariana Islands in the Ninth Circuit.47 The Coble-
Berman proposal is emphasized because it is most analogous to 
the measure that Congress adopted, and the remaining proposals 
have received evaluation elsewhere.48 
House Bill 908 was similar in some important respects to the 
study commission ideas that the 104th Congress examined. The 
Coble-Berman measure mandated that the commission "study 
the structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals sys-
tem, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit."49 The sec-
ond phrase modifies the notion used in the 104th Congress by 
including the term "system," thereby clarifying and emphasizing 
the systemic nature of the assessment envisioned.50 House Bill 
908 also commanded the entity to "report ... its recommenda-
tions for such changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may 
be appropriate for the expeditious and effective disposition of 
the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals, consistent with 
44 See S. 248, 105th Cong. (1997). The ideas in this paragraph and this subsection 
are premised on conversations with people who are knowledgeable about the devel-
opments that occurred. 
45 See S. 283, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 639, 105th Cong. (1997). 
46 See H.R. 908, 105th Cong. (1997). 
47 See S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997); see also supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
48 See Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49 FLA. 
L. REV. 189, 205-14 (1997). 
49 H.R. 908, 105th Cong. § l(b)(l)-(2) (1997). Compare id. and S. 248, 105th 
Cong. § l(b)(l)-(2) (1997), with S. 283, 105th Cong.§ l(b)(l)-(2) (1997), and H.R. 
639, 105th Cong.§ l(b)(l)-(2) (1997). 
50 Compare S. 248, 105th Cong. § l(b)(2) (1997), H.R. 908, 105th Cong. § l(b)(2) 
(1997), and H.R. 639, 105th Cong. § l(b)(2) (1997), with S. 956, 105th Cong. 
§ 1 (b )(2) (1995). 
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fundamental concepts of fairness and due process."51 On June 3, 
the House adopted a variation on the Coble-Berman proposal 
which incorporated numerous compromises.52 This version in-
cluded the reporting provision considered immediately above 
and afforded the Commission eighteen months to conclude the 
analysis. The House transmitted the measure to the Senate, and 
the bill was held at the desk awaiting action in that chamber. 
In mid-July, Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), Senator Gorton, 
and Senator Burns, who were members of the Appropriations 
Committee, persuaded their colleagues to approve an appropria-
tions rider that would have divided the Ninth Circuit, and on July 
29, the Senate adopted it. The measure would have left Califor-
nia and Nevada in that court and would have created a new 
Twelfth Circuit which included Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Montana, Oregon, Washington, Guam, and the Northern Mari-
ana Islands.53 The rider authorized fifteen judges for the Ninth 
Circuit and thirteen judges for the Twelfth Circuit and assigned 
the Twelfth Circuit two co-equal headquarters and two co-equal 
court clerks in Phoenix and in Seattle. 
Republican senators, principally from the West, voiced many 
arguments that they had earlier expressed for affirmative Senate 
action during the floor debate. For instance, they repeated the 
notion that the Ninth Circuit's size, in terms of population, geog-
raphy, caseloads, and judges, creates problems, such as travel ex-
penses and conflicting precedent. Several senators asserted that 
the rate at which the Supreme Court reverses the Ninth Circuit 
showed that the court requires bifurcation. They claimed that 
projected population expansion in the West would exacerbate 
these difficulties. 54 
Critics of the court's division claimed that there was too little 
clarity about the precise nature of the complications facing the 
Ninth Circuit and other appeals courts and the best solutions for 
those problems were not to adopt dramatic remedies, such as 
splitting the Ninth Circuit. Many important issues involving the 
court and other circuits are ones as to which there is insufficient 
understanding. For example, division's proponents have con-
51 H.R. 908, 105th Cong. § l(b)(3) (1997). 
52 See 143 CONG. REc. H3223-25 (daily ed. June 3, 1997). 
53 I rely in the remainder of this and the next three paragraphs on S. 1022, 105th 
Cong. § 305 (1997), and 143 CoNG. REc. S8041 (daily ed. July 24, 1997). 
54 143 CoNG. REc. S8007 (daily ed. July 29, 1997). 
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tended that the Ninth Circuit's magnitude prevents expeditious 
case resolution. However, little empirical data correlate size with 
time to disposition. 
The proposed bifurcation also posed significant practical diffi-
culties. It would have inappropriately allocated the court's ap-
peals. For instance, judges of the projected Twelfth Circuit 
would have had to resolve 239 cases annually, while judges of the 
proposed Ninth Circuit would have had to decide 363 appeals 
annually, which would have been fifty percent more. During 
floor debate, senators rejected 55-45 by political party an amend-
ment that would have authorized an analysis similar to the one 
that the House had approved. 
The appropriations rider provoked criticism from Representa-
tive Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), chair of the Judiciary Committee, Rep-
resentative Coble, chair of the subcommittee responsible for the 
matter, and the California delegation.55 These lawmakers enun-
ciated several contentions against circuit division. For example, 
they claimed that the proposed split would improperly distribute 
the docket between the two projected courts and that action as 
radical as division required clearer comprehension of the exact 
complications that the circuit and the appellate system were ex-
periencing, the impacts of those problems, and the most effective 
means of addressing them. 
In mid-November, the House-Senate Conference Committee 
on Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations rejected the appro-
priations rider that would have bifurcated the Ninth Circuit.56 
The Committee substituted a national study that incorporated 
numerous aspects of the proposals that the Senate and the House 
had considered and that essentially included most features of 
House Bill 908. The compromise authorized five Commissioners, 
all of whom the Chief Justice of the United States was to appoint 
within thirty days. It gave the Commission ten months to study 
55 See, e.g., Letter from Henry J. Hyde, Chair, House Judiciary, Comm., to Rob-
ert Livingston, Chair, House Comm. on Appropriations (Sept. 5, 1997) (on file with 
author); Letter from Jerry Lewis et al., Members of Congress from California, to 
Harold Rogers, Chair, Appropriations Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, and State 
(Oct. 17, 1997) (on file with author). I also rely in this paragraph on conversations 
with individuals who are knowledgeable about the developments that occurred. 
56 See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119 § 305, 111 Stat. 2440, 
2491-92 (1997) (reprinted at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1997) (historical and statutory notes)); 
Bill Kisliuk, White, Rymer to Consider Circuit Split, THE RECORDER, Dec. 22, 1997, 
at 1. 
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the courts and two months to write a report and suggestions 
while including verbatim House Bill 908's charge. On December 
19, Chief Justice William Rehnquist named retired Supreme 
Court Justice Byron White, United States Court of Appeals 
Judges Gilbert Merritt of the Sixth Circuit, Pamela Rymer of the 
Ninth Circuit, United States District Judge William Browning of 
Arizona, and N. Lee Cooper, the immediate past president of the 
American Bar Association. 
In sum, the November 1997 legislation which approved a na-
tional commission to assess the federal appellate courts left am-
biguous some important aspects of the evaluation and afforded 
the commissioners relatively little time to finish their work. Ac-
cordingly, the second section of this Article considers the efforts 
that the entity instituted in completing the significant assignment 
that Congress gave the Commission. 
II 
THE COMMISSION'S WORK 
One critical factor makes it difficult to describe the efforts that 
the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals instituted during the brief period it had to an-
alyze the federal appellate system, formulate the report, and 
make suggestions for Congress and the President.57 This consid-
eration was that most of the Commission's activities were not 
matters of public record. For example, many Commission meet-
ings were private, and communications involving the commis-
sioners and the staff were not made public. In fairness, the 
significant, controversial, and delicate character of the Commis-
sion's endeavors and the need to promote candid interchange 
might have required secrecy. Moreover, the commissioners did 
attempt to inform the public by establishing a website. Despite 
these problems, numerous significant initiatives can be deline-
ated partly by consulting the material incorporated in the Com-
mission report. 
During the commissioners' initial formal meeting in January 
1998, they named Professor Daniel Meador as Executive Direc-
tor.58 In early 1998, the Commission began assembling, evaluat-
ing, and synthesizing considerable relevant information on the 
57 I rely in this section on conversations with numerous people who are familiar 
with the Commission's work. 
58 See COMMISSION REPORT. supra note 1: see also Departments of Commerce. 
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federal appeals courts. One of the entity's first actions was to 
seek the aid of the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) and of the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts (AO), the princi-
pal research and administrative arms of the federal courts.59 
Congress had instructed the commissioners to enlist the assis-
tance of these institutions, and the Commission worked with the 
FJC and the AO throughout the project.60 
In the early stage of the Commission's efforts, the entity asked 
that the FJC assemble a detailed account of the difficulties that 
the appellate courts were apparently confronting and possible 
remedies for the complications.61 The FJC carefully reviewed 
the considerable, previous research on the circuits and collected 
comprehensive lists of the problems that the courts purportedly 
encounter and potential solutions. 
From the initial phases, the commissioners also sought public 
input on many questions that implicated its charge.62 The Com-
mission conducted public hearings during March in Atlanta and 
Dallas, cities apparently chosen because they are situated in the 
appeals courts that Congress created from the former Fifth Cir-
cuit. The commissioners held hearings during April in Chicago 
and New York, two of the country's major metropolitan areas 
and the headquarters for the Seventh and Second Circuits. The 
Commission held public hearings during May in Seattle and San 
Francisco, partly to solicit the perspectives of those in the West. 
The commissioners asked that witnesses address perceived diffi-
culties in the appellate system's structure, organization, align-
ment, procedures, and personnel that might interfere with 
determinations that "are reasonably timely, are consistent among 
the litigants appearing before it, are nationally uniform in their 
interpretations of federal law, and are reached through processes 
that afford appeals adequate, deliberative attention of judges."63 
The Commission also requested possible solutions to the 
problems, as well as the remedies' advantages and detriments, 
Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 
§ 305(a)(4)(A). 
59 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
60 See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act§ 305(a)(4)(D). 
61 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
62 See id. at 2-3. 
63 Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Ap-
pellate Commission Schedules Public Hearings (Feb. 26, 1998) (press release). 
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while wondering what features of the courts were operating well. 
Individuals and institutions that did, or could, not appear at the 
hearings were asked to submit written comments. 
Numerous witnesses who spoke at the hearings were federal 
appeals court judges.64 The witnesses tendered useful material 
regarding the difficulties that mounting dockets and restricted re-
sources pose for the regional circuits as well as potential reme-
dies for these problems. 
The Commission heard a wide range of perspectives related to 
the complications and possible solutions; few new concepts were 
adduced. Most witnesses gave testimony that effectively reiter-
ated ideas that they or others had previously voiced. Illustrative 
of this were statements of Eleventh Circuit Chief Judge Joseph 
Hatchett and Gerald Bard Tjoflat, the court's former Chief 
Judge, who continued their dialogue over whether the court re-
quires more active judgeships to treat its substantial, growing 
docket. Chief Judge Hatchett called for the court's expansion 
"from twelve to fifteen judges," while Judge Tjoflat rejected ad-
ditional judgeships.65 However, each jurist had made analogous, 
prior public statements.66 A small number of witnesses asserted 
that the appeals courts encounter difficulties that are sufficiently 
problematic to warrant treatment, particularly with measures as 
dramatic as dividing circuits. 
The FJC assisted the commissioners in developing several 
surveys, which were circulated to circuit and district judges as 
well as to lawyers who have pursued appeals, to seek information 
related to their experiences. Moreover, the commissioners solic-
ited the perspectives of the Supreme Court Justices.67 Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, a former member of the Ninth Circuit, Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor, the Justice responsible for the court, Jus-
64 The assertions in this paragraph are premised on review of the hearing 
transcripts. 
65 See Testimony Before the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals (Mar. 23, 1998) (statements of Joseph W. Hatchett, Chief Judge, 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and Gerald Bard Tjoflat, 
Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit) (on file with 
author). 
66 See Considering the Appropriate A/location of Judgeships in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
On Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th 
Cong. (1997) (testimony of Chief Judge Hatchett); Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More 
Judges, Less Justice: The Case Against Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 79 AB.A. 
J. 70, 70 (1993). 
67 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. 
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tice John Paul Stevens, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Ste-
phen Breyer tendered comments.68 The first four Justices 
asserted that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is too large and 
urged that three regional circuits be carved out of the current 
Ninth Circuit. One would encompass the five states of the Pa-
cific Northwest, a second would include the Eastern and North-
ern Districts of California and Hawaii, and the third would 
incorporate the Central and Southern Districts of California, Ar-
izona, Nevada, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. Justice 
Breyer recognized that caseload growth is the principal problem 
facing the appeals courts; however, he rejected circuit division 
and asked the commissioners to consider the various solutions 
found in the Long Range Plan assembled by the Judicial 
Conference.69 
The commissioners gathered, assessed, and synthesized all of 
the material they had sought and received. The commissioners 
then compiled a tentative draft report and suggestions which they 
issued for public comment on October 7; interested parties were 
given thirty days to respond. The commissioners reviewed public 
input, changed some aspects of the draft report and proposals in 
light of public comment, and finalized them for Congress and the 
President during December. 
III 
ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION REPORT 
A. Descriptive Analysis 
The Commission determined that Ninth Circuit administration 
68 See Letter from Anthony M. Kennedy, Justice, United States Supreme Court. 
to Byron R. White, Chair, Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals (Aug. 17, 1998) (on file with author); Letter from Sandra Day 
O'Connor, Justice, United States Supreme Court, to Byron R. White. Chair. Com-
mission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (June 23, 1998) 
(on file with author); Letter from Antonin Scalia, Justice, United States Supreme 
Court to Byron R. White, Chair, Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Fed-
eral Courts of Appeals (Aug. 21, 1998) (on file with author); Letter from John Paul 
Stevens, Justice, United States Supreme Court, to Byron R. White, Chair, Commis-
sion on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Aug. 24, 1998) 
(on file with author); Letter from Stephen G. Breyer, Justice, United States Su-
preme Court, to Byron R. White. Chair, Commission on Structural Alternatives for 
the Federal Courts of Appeals (Sept. 11. 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Breyer Letter]. 
69 See Breyer Letter. supra note 68; see also COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLAN-
NING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES. LONG RANGE PLAN 
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (1995) (hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. 
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was at least equivalent to "that of other circuits, and innovative 
in many respects" and that there was "no good reason to split the 
circuit solely out of concern for its size or administration [or] to 
solve problems [of] consistency, predictability, and coherence of 
circuit law."70 The commissioners correspondingly observed that 
bifurcating the Ninth Circuit would forfeit the administrative ad-
vantages provided by the present circuit alignment and deprive 
the west coast and the western United States of a way to preserve 
uniform federal law in the region.71 
The Commission rejected circuit division unless no other 
means of addressing perceived problems in the court of appeals 
could be found, and the commissioners recommended three re-
gionally-premised adjudicative divisions as an effective approach 
for the Ninth Circuit and an option which the remaining courts 
should have as they grow.72 The commissioners suggested that 
"each division with a majority of its judges resident in its region" 
have jurisdiction to resolve cases emanating from districts in the 
areas.73 The commissioners proposed that a Circuit Division 
treat inconsistencies that arise from regional divisions.74 The 
Commission claimed that its approach would enhance the "con-
sistency and coherence of the law, maximize the likelihood of 
genuine collegiality, establish an effective procedure for main-
taining uniform decisional law within the circuit, and relate the 
appellate forum more closely to the region it serves. "75 
The commissioners recognized that Congress could reject the 
divisional idea while reconfiguring the Ninth Circuit and ob-
served that the "challenges to finding a workable solution are 
daunting. "76 The Commission assessed some dozen prospects 
and "found no merit in any of them."77 However, the commis-
sioners described only the three possibilities they found even ar-
guable but characterized each as flawed and endorsed none.78 
The commissioners also considered structural alternatives for 
the courts of appeals.79 The Commission commented that it had 
70 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at ix. 
71 See id. at ix-x. 
72 See id. at x. 
73 Id. 
74 See id. at 45-46. 
75 Id. at x; see also id. at 40-46. 
76 Id. at 53. 
77 Id. 
78 See id. at 53-57. 
79 See id. at 59-66. 
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formulated divisions for the Ninth Circuit today and as a viable 
alternative to reconfiguration for the other circuits as they ex-
pand.80 The commissioners proposed legislation that would give 
specific courts the flexibility to develop a divisional plan, 
stressing that the Ninth Circuit recommendation was only one 
model.81 
Realizing that the twelve courts vary in terms of their magni-
tude, caseloads, resources and growth, the Commission suggested 
that Congress "equip those courts to cope with future, unfore-
seen conditions by according them a flexibility they do not now 
have. "82 The commissioners specifically proposed that Congress 
empower all of the circuits to assign panels of two, rather than 
three, appellate judges to those cases that do not implicate issues 
of public importance, present special difficulty, or have prece-
dential value as well as to establish district court appellate panels 
comprised of two district judges and one circuit judge to review 
specific classes of cases with discretionary review in the court of 
appeals.83 The commissioners asserted that these concepts col-
lectively "should equip the courts of appeals with an ability, 
structurally and procedurally, to accommodate continued 
caseload growth into the indefinite future, while maintaining the 
quality of the appellate process and delivering consistent deci-
sions-assuming, of course, that the system has the necessary 
number of judges and other resources."84 
B. Critical Analysis 
Several important considerations frustrate efforts to assess crit-
ically the Commission recommendations, especially by attempt-
ing to evaluate the possible impact on natural resources. Perhaps 
most significant, because the federal judiciary has never applied 
the commissioners' core proposal, which calls for implementation 
of divisions in the Ninth Circuit today and in other appeals courts 
as they grow, predictions regarding the divisional approach are 
speculative. Moreover, some Commission ideas, namely those 
which implicate potential expansion of the Federal Circuit's juris-
diction to include tax and social security appeals, are irrelevant. 
80 See id. at 59-60. 
81 See id. at 60-62. 
82 Id. at xi. 
83 See id. at 64. 
84 Id. at xi; see also id. at 67-74. 
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Other recommendations, including suggestions for two-judge, as 
well as district court and bankruptcy appellate panels, are only 
tangentially related to natural resources. Even had federal 
courts employed divisions and if the less central Commission 
proposals were more relevant, additional phenomena would 
complicate assessment-the perceived political character of judi-
cial selection and of numerous natural resources appeals and the 
difficulty of analyzing appellate accuracy in this field. However, 
it is possible to evaluate the commissioners' work by emphasizing 
their recommendation for Ninth Circuit divisions and by making 
future projections based on current circumstances. 
The divisional organization that the Commission proposed 
could significantly affect natural resources in several ways. One 
is that divisions might preclude realization of the important ob-
jective which the commissioners themselves clearly and strongly 
articulated: "Having a single court interpret and apply federal 
law in the western United States ... is a strength of the circuit 
that should be maintained."85 Achievement of this goal is crucial 
to natural resources because Congress intended that many stat-
utes which govern the field receive analogous construction and 
enforcement, especially across the West, which shares certain at-
tributes. These attributes include substantial public landhold-
ings, arid climates, critical needs for water, as well as common 
boundaries (namely rivers), ecosystems that traverse state lines, 
and similar flora and fauna, some of which are endangered or 
threatened. 
Despite the Commission's recognition of this laudable pur-
pose, the proposed structure may well complicate its attainment. 
For example, divisions would fail to preserve uniform circuit law 
because the determinations of panels and divisional en bane 
courts would lack binding effect throughout the Ninth Circuit. 
An en bane decision of a division that does not conflict with an 
opinion of another division would be reviewable only through 
certiorari to the Supreme Court and would frustrate the Ninth 
Circuit's interpretation and application of federal law. This situa-
tion could be peculiarly problematic for individuals and institu-
tions that depend on federal law's construction and enforcement 
in California. For example, the Middle Division might invalidate 
a state ballot initiative implicating natural resources, even as the 
measure would remain applicable in the Southern Division. The 
85 Id. at 49-50. 
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Circuit Division, a seven-judge court with limited representation 
from the full circuit, not the Middle and Southern Divisions, 
which include California, would correspondingly resolve incon-
sistent interpretations of those divisions. 
The divisional organization's placement of specific phenom-
ena, such as ecosystems, wildlife corridors, river drainages, and 
endangered species habitat, in different divisions could have sig-
nificant impacts on the resources. One clear example of this con-
cern was proffered in 1990 testimony on proposed legislation to 
split the Ninth Circuit. Then-Senator Pete Wilson (R-Cal.) 
raised the spectra of diverse application of the law at the Kla-
math River's Oregon headwaters and at its California mouth, as 
well as unseemly races to the courthouse and forum-shopping.86 
This illustration implicates the proposed Northern and Middle 
Divisions, although similar situations will exist in the Middle and 
Southern Divisions, particularly because each division includes 
two federal districts situated in California. 
A third way that the divisional approach might affect natural 
resources is by imposing unnecessary expense and delay in appel-
late resolution. This would especially disadvantage resource-
poor litigants, many of whom pursue natural resources cases.87 
For instance, the use of divisional en banes could entail addi-
tional costs for the parties involved and greater delay in securing 
an ultimate decision. The suggested Circuit Division would cor-
respondingly create another tier before finality, thus increasing 
expense and delay. Moreover, much litigation might ensue over 
what constitutes a conflict with attendant costs and delays. 
The contemplated divisional arrangement could also affect 
natural resources by constituting three-judge panels, as well as 
the divisional en bane courts and the Circuit Division differently 
than those panels and the limited en bane courts are presently 
comprised. This may happen, despite the commissioners' em-
phatic declaration that circuits and appeals courts should not be 
realigned or left alone, because of specific judicial decisions or 
particular judges. The divisional structure might lead to different 
resolution of natural resources appeals in divisional three-judge 
panels and en bane courts and the Circuit Division, but several 
86 See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 16, at 284-85. 
87 See Carl Tobias. Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, 33 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 429 (1992); see also Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BuFF. 
L. REV. 485, 497-98 (1988-1989). 
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phenomena complicate precise assessment. For instance, the di-
visions will include only a majority of resident judges, thereby 
leaving unclear the composition of divisional panels and en bane 
courts. The Ninth Circuit will decide the Circuit Division's con-
stitution, so predicting substantive results is fraught with 
difficulty. 
However, an effort can be undertaken using the example of 
the Northern Division. This analysis assumes that the division's 
active resident judges would comprise a majority on most divi-
sional three-judge panels and divisional en bane courts and ap-
plies the judges' prior voting records in natural resources cases as 
crude proxies for how they might resolve future appeals. The 
analysis suggests that the division's three-judge panels and its en 
bane court would be less likely than three-judge panels and the 
en bane court of the Ninth Circuit (as presently constituted) to 
issue decisions that protect the environment. 
In short, the Commission has proposed a divisional structure 
for the Ninth Circuit that could have important impacts on natu-
ral resources in the region. Pressure to implement divisions for 
the Ninth Circuit will probably grow over the near term, while 
the 106th Congress seriously considered the divisional approach, 
held Senate and House hearings on the concept88 and might au-
thorize or require divisions in the future. Given this possibility, 
the fourth section provides recommendations for the future. 
IV 
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Introduction 
Individuals and groups that are concerned about the environ-
ment, public lands, and natural resources, as well as about the 
federal courts in the West and the nation, must scrutinize the re-
port and proposals recently issued by the Commission on Struc-
tural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals. These 
people and entities should develop views on issues examined in 
88 See Review of the Report by the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the 
Federal Courts of Appeals Regarding the Ninth Circuit and S. 253, the Ninth Circuit 
Reorganization Act: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. On Admin. 
Oversight and the Courts, 106th Cong. (July 16. 1999); Oversight Hearing on the 
Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals Before the House Judiciary Subcomm. On Courts and lntellectllal Property, 
106th Cong. (July 22, 1999). 
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the report and on the commissioners' suggestions and convey 
their sentiments to members of the legislative, judicial, and exec-
utive branches. 
The goal of securing appellate determinations that are more 
solicitous of those who would develop natural resources is not a 
proper reason for reconfiguring circuits or for instituting the pro-
posed divisional arrangement. The Senate Committee Report 
(Report), which attended Senate Bill 956 and was apparently 
compiled as an advocacy document for realigning the Ninth Cir-
cuit, clearly detailed why the Judiciary Committee found this 
purpose inappropriate. The Report stated that some champions 
of bifurcation premised their view on "outcomes in certain cases 
or on a perceived liberal bias on the part of California judges 
[and] [f]requently cited ... environmental cases affecting the 
northwest States,"89 but declared that "[ t ]he committee does not 
support a split of the ninth circuit on those bases."90 The Report 
correspondingly remarked that numerous parties had registered 
opposition to some environmental and other Ninth Circuit deci-
sions, although the committee found this dissatisfaction an im-
proper ·rationale for dividing courts and rejected the alteration of 
"circuit boundaries in order to achieve a given ideological out-
come on the merits in any case or to benefit any regional inter-
est. "91 The Report concomitantly criticized as "questionable" 
the appropriateness of "considering the judicial philosophies and 
resulting opinions of particular judges or regions when examining 
circuit boundaries. "92 The Commission similarly characterized as 
undebatable the impropriety of premising determinations to 
restructure circuits or courts on the specific substantive decisions 
of judges.93 
In 1990, during hearings on a measure to divide the Ninth Cir-
cuit, Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Or.) argued that creating a pro-
posed Twelfth Circuit consisting of the five Pacific Northwest 
states would implement Congress's original intent when delineat-
ing appellate boundaries: the establishment of circuits which re-
89 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8 (1995); see also supra notes 15-16 and accompanying 
text. 
90 S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8; see also id. at 25-27. 
91 Id. at 8 (expressing hope that the court will reach correct legal decisions and 
stating that parties are entitled to full, fair, and prompt decision on the merits but 
not to a given result). 
92 Id. at 9. 
93 See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. 
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fleeted a regional identity by including a "small set of contiguous 
states that shared a common background."94 This contention 
could also support the divisional approach that the commission-
ers recently recommended. 
Several concepts appear more persuasive than these proposi-
tions, which effectively derive from the idea of regionalism, al-
though this notion may retain some continuing vitality, as the 
Commission recognized.95 Basing divisions on the aspiration to 
honor Congress's century-old purpose in drawing circuit bounda-
ries seems rather obsolete, given, for instance, the increasing 
globalization and computerization of modern American society 
and the appellate system.96 A better solution may be to invoke 
principles of diversity, which might be defined in terms of geo-
graphical, political, environmental, or demographic differences, 
when configuring appeals courts in a culture that depends on 
"law as the adhesive force binding a diverse population 
together. "97 
Insofar as regional considerations may be applicable in specific 
cases, district judges can arguably take account of these factors. 98 
As to circuits, the areas where judges are stationed should be of 
little relevance. The appellate courts also have a federalizing re-
sponsibility to reconcile the Constitution and congressional legis-
lation with more localized policies.99 In short, local favoritism 
contravenes the concept of a circuit and the fragmentation of na-
tional law offends the notion of federalization,100 while political 
considerations are rarely appropriate reasons for federal court 
policymaking, which is as important as realigning circuits. 101 
94 S. 948 Hearing, supra note 16, at 252 (statement of Sen. Mark Hatfield (R-
Or.)). 
95 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 44-45. 
96 See Tobias, Impoverished Idea, supra note 3, at 1372. 
97 Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 
45 DUKE L.J. 929, 940 (1996); see also Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for 
a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 11, 35-39 (1996). See 
generally MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLU-
SION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990). 
98 See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 16, at 694-95 (statement of Eric Redman); see 
also Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries, supra note 3, at 942. 
99 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL CouRTS 10-13 (5th ed. 1994); 
John Minor Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LoY. L. REv. 787, 788 (1980). 
100 See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 16, at 286; Baker, On Redrawing Circuit 
Boundaries, supra note 3, at 942-43; ABA Appellate Practice Comm., Subcomm. to 
Study Circuit Size, Report 3 (1992); see also Tjoflat, supra note 65 (analyzing 
fragmentation). 
IOI See Cass R. Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. 
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B. Specific Recommendations 
Before Congress authorizes the divisional approach, it must 
have systematically collected empirical data which clearly show 
that mounting caseloads and additional phenomena that affect 
the Ninth Circuit are sufficiently problematic to deserve 
remediation and that divisions would be efficacious. However, 
some divisional arrangement may be implemented because the 
lack of practical experience with divisions precludes definitive 
conclusions regarding their value or because other factors, espe-
cially political concerns, could influence the ultimate decision. 
For example, some senators from the Pacific Northwest will con-
tinue to favor the Ninth Circuit's bifurcation, for which the divi-
sional concept may be a precursor.102 Political factors should not 
dictate congressional policymaking related to the federal courts, 
but there is a narrow sphere, that even Article III of the Consti-
tution acknowledges, in which proper political considerations can 
apply.1m 
Persons and organizations with concerns about natural re-
sources as well as the federal judicial system in the western 
United States and the country, therefore, must think pragmati-
cally and imaginatively about the Commission's report and rec-
ommendations. For instance, scientists might apply their 
technical expertise to predict precisely what the divisional ap-
proach would mean for natural resources located within the 
Ninth Circuit. They could identify discrete resources, such as riv-
ers, endangered species, national parks, and wildlife refuges, 
which will be situated in the proposed three divisions and the 
legal regimes that may govern the phenomena. Attorneys might 
attempt to ascertain what the exact composition of three-judge 
panels and en bane courts in the three divisions as well as the 
Circuit Division would portend for natural resources, especially 
vis-a-vis current panels and the present en bane court. More spe-
L. REv. 976, 997-1000 (1982); see also Tobias, Impoverished Idea, supra note 3, at 
1374-75; supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text (reproducing excerpts from Sen-
ate Committee Report suggesting refusal to countenance circuit-splitting premised 
on political factors). 
102 See Timothy Egan, "War" Refrain is Given the Boot. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 
1996, at A36; supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. See generally WILLIAM 
PERRY PENDLEY, WAR ON THE WEST: GOVERNMENT TYRANNY ON AMERICA'S 
GREAT FRONTIER (1995). 
103 See supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also S. REP. No. 104-197, at 8, 
30 (1995) (recognizing independent responsibilities of Judiciary Committee and 
Congress to monitor courts and treat problems identified). 
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cifically, lawyers could assess earlier environmental decisionmak-
ing of the active resident judges who would comprise numerous 
panels and en bane courts in each division to determine how they 
might resolve future appeals involving resources. 
These people and entities should formulate a wide spectrum of 
practicable approaches that would make sense in terms of envi-
ronment, public lands, and natural resources in the West while 
honoring significant values that implicate the federal courts, such 
as prompt, economical, and fair appellate disposition. Con-
cerned individuals and institutions must anticipate calls for Con-
gress to authorize divisions by developing workable alternatives. 
A valuable illustration of a feasible option would be affording 
the Ninth Circuit sufficient flexibility to continue experimenta-
tion with measures that could realize the Commission's objec-
tives in less intrusive ways. The commissioners clearly intended 
that the divisional arrangement enhance territorial connections 
between the judges deciding cases in the area from which appeals 
arise, enable smaller groups of judges to function as a court when 
articulating the law that applies to a specific region, and facilitate 
more careful monitoring of the opinions of three-judge panels 
inside the divisions. 
However, the Ninth Circuit may be able to achieve these goals 
with fewer disruptions by maintaining the current structure and 
experimenting with promising approaches. 104 Indeed, an Evalua-
tion Committee, which has been analyzing the court and sug-
gesting means to improve operations in response to perceived 
concerns aired by the Commission, has proffered recommenda-
tions involving regionalism. 105 For example, the Committee pro-
posed, and the circuit is experimenting with, regional 
assignments, whereby one judge who is located in the administra-
tive unit from which an appeal arises serves on the panel that 
hears the case. 106 Judges of particular divisions could have spe-
cial responsibility for reviewing more closely decisions in their 
104 When commenting on the Commission's Tentative Draft Report, Chief Judge 
Hug suggested, for example, that the circuit might temporarily institute three divi-
sions with oral argument panels in each division comprising two resident judges. See 
Procter Hug, Jr., Comments on the White Commission Draft Report (Oct. 29, 1998) 
(on file with author). 
105 See Ninth Circuit Evaluation Committee, Interim Report 12-13 (Mar. 2000). 
See generally Procter Hug, Jr. & Carl Tobias, A Preferable Approach for the Ninth 
Circuit, 88 CAL L. REv. 1657 (2000). 
106 See S. 1403, 106th Cong. (1999). The bill, which Sen. Diane Feinstein (D-Cal.) 
introduced, includes reformation of the en bane process. 
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regions by, for instance, relying on the circulation of opinions 
before formal publication.107 The Ninth Circuit might also ex-
pand the limited en bane court to thirteen or fifteen judges with 
equal representation from the divisions, an idea that the circuit 
recently endorsed.108 
Should Congress find unsatisfactory the continued Ninth Cir-
cuit experimentation with the measures above or other concepts, 
those concerned about natural resources may want to explore ad-
ditional alternatives. One helpful option would be the establish-
ment of a court with national subject matter jurisdiction, which 
would hear all cases related to the environment, public lands, and 
natural resources.109 The District of Columbia Circuit essentially 
operates this way in treating appeals that legislation governing 
these areas commands or allows parties to pursue in the tribu-
nal. 110 The Federal Circuit is a useful, general analogue. 111 
Scholars have also evaluated the concepts of scientific and envi-
ronmental courts, which would afford some advantages, namely 
particularized expertise in the substantive fields under review.112 
However, these courts could have certain disadvantages, princi-
pally the possibility of developing tunnel vision and being influ-
enced by various interests, such as regulated industries or 
specialized practitioners.113 Moreover, the federal judicial sys-
tem has not formally implemented scientific or environmental 
107 Some courts now rely on prepublication circulation. See 3o Cm. 1.0.P. 5.6; 
4TH Cm. 1.0.P. 36.2. 
10s See S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 1403, 106th Cong. (1999). For the endorse-
ment, see Evaluation Committee Report, supra note 105, at 4-5. For discussion of 
additional ideas, see Evaluation Committee Report, supra. 
109 For general analyses of subject matter courts, see Baker, supra note 3, at 261-
69; Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 745 (1981); 
Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution Through Subject 
Matter Organization, 16 U. M1cH. J.L. REFORM 471 (1983). 
110 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) (1994). See generally 
Sunstein, supra note 101, at 998 (discussing the D.C. Circuit). 
111 See Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 41 (1994)). See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A 
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Tenth Anniversary Commemorative Issue, 41 AM. U. 
L. REV. 559-1074 (1992). 
112 See, e.g., James L. Oakes, Developments in Environmental Law, 3 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 50001, 50011-12 (1973); Scott C. Whitney, The Case For Creating a Special En-
vironmental Court System, 14 WM. & MARYL. REV. 473 (1973); Gordon J. Zimmer-
man, Synergy and the Science Court: Scientific Method and the Adversarial System in 
Technology Assessment, 38 U. TORONTO FAc. L. REV. 170 (1980). 
113 See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 Ao-
MIN. L. REv. 329, 335-36 (1991); Meador, supra note 109, at 482-84; William M. 
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tribunals, apparently because Congress and the federal judiciary 
seem to prefer general courts.114 
If senators and representatives choose to bifurcate the Ninth 
Circuit or require divisions, persons and organizations concerned 
about natural resources and the federal courts may wish to ex-
amine how the districts that are now constituents of the Ninth 
Circuit could be grouped. They might think in terms of phenom-
ena, such as ecosystems, like the one involving Yosemite Na-
tional Park and its environs; habitat for endangered species, 
namely old growth forests implicating the spotted owl; and wild-
life corridors, including those for grizzly bears in Idaho. 
Individuals and groups with concerns could correspondingly 
consider particular resources, or the perceived perspectives of 
specific judges, in the proposed divisions, but they should re-
member that emphasizing these considerations over other sub-
stantive factors, such as economic development, or important 
procedural values, including federal court access, may be unde-
sirable.115 Concerned individuals and entities might evaluate the 
prospect of different combinations in the districts in the current 
Ninth Circuit for the proposed divisions. For example, the preva-
lent natural phenomena and the prevailing political viewpoints in 
certain Ninth Circuit districts, such as Idaho and Montana, both 
located in the projected Northern Division, probably resemble 
one another more than they do those of other districts, such as 
the Northern District of California situated in the Middle Divi-
sion or the Southern District of California, located in the South-
ern Division. The approach recently proposed could create 
divisions that have similar resources or relatively compatible per-
spectives; however, it might forfeit diversity of resources and 
viewpoints. 116 
Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Re-
quiem for The Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 273, 319-320 (1996). 
114 See LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 69, at 43; Richman & Reynolds, supra 
note 113, at 319-20; see also supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing legis-
lation that requires or permits appeals of natural resources cases to the D.C. Cir-
cuit). Of course, subject matter panels could be created within existing circuits. See 
Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 120-22 (1990); Baker, supra note 3, 
at 261-69; see also Meador, supra note 109, at 476-77 (reporting that oil and gas 
appeals are assigned to special panel of several judges in the Fifth Circuit who have 
developed expertise in the area). 
115 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text; see also supra note 96 and 
accompanying text (discussing diversity). 
116 For discussion of diversity, see supra note 96 and accompanying text; see also 
supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text (suggesting circuit-splitting advocates ex-
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CONCLUSION 
Those concerned about the environment, public lands, and nat-
ural resources as well as federal courts in the western United 
States and the country should scrutinize the suggestions of the 
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals. They must think practically and creatively about the 
Ninth Circuit and divisions while formulating practicable alterna-
tives to the divisional arrangement recommended. Systematic, 
imaginative anticipation could help protect the substantial natu-
ral resources of the West and honor values that are important to 
the federal judicial system. 
perienced resistance when they broached the possibility of moving Arizona to the 
Tenth Circuit during the 104th Congress). 
